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Abstract. For one–period projects under certainty, the notion of Net Present Value (NPV) formally 
translates the notion of economic profit, where the discount rate is the cost of capital. Under 
uncertainty, the cost of capital is the expected rate of return of an equivalent-risk alternative that the 
investor might undertake and is often found by making recourse to the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
This paper shows that the notions of disequilibrium NPV and economic profit for risky one-period 
projects are not equivalent: NPV-minded agents are open to framing effects and to arbitrage losses, 
which imply violations of Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. The notion of disequilibrium (present) 
value, deductively derived from the CAPM by several authors and widely used in applied corporate 
finance, should therefore be dismissed. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Economic profit on one side, (net) present value on the other side. The former is one of the 
building blocks of economic theory, the latter is a cornerstone in financial economics. 
Economic profit is a fundamental notion in economic theory since Marshall (1890). It 
represents the “excess profit that is gained from an investment over and above the profit that could be 
obtained from the best alternative foregone” (Rao, 1992, p. 87). That is, economic profit from an 
investment is the difference between profit from that investment and profit from the best alternative 
foregone. In other terms, the foregone alternative’s profit acts as an opportunity cost (see Buchanan, 
1969). As known, many synonyms have been coined to mean ‘economic profit’: ‘excess profit’ 
(Preinreich, 1938), ‘excess realizable profit’ (Edwards and Bell, 1961), ‘excess income’ (Peasnell, 
1982), ‘abnormal earnings’ (Ohlson, 1995), ‘supernormal profit’ (see Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch, 
1984, p. 121), ‘residual income’ (Solomons, 1965; Biddle, Bowen, and Wallace, 1999; Martin, Petty 
and Rich, 2003), ‘economic value added’ (Stewart, 1991). The concept of ‘Goodwill’ (e.g., Preinreich, 
1936) is also strictly related to that of excess profit.1 
Net Present Value (NPV) is a fundamental notion in finance since Fisher (1930), although “the 
technology of discounting is not an invention of twentieth century” (Miller and Napier, 1993, p. 640): 
Discounted-cash-flow analysis was known and (sometimes) employed since eighteenth century 
(Brackenborough, McLean and Oldroyd, 2001. See also Parker, 1968; Edwards and Warman, 1981). 
As known, the NPV is a function of the discount rate, and the latter is often found by making use of the 
classical Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966), which 
puts into effect the NPV methodology. 
The notions of economic profit and NPV are often viewed as two sides of the same medal: The 
NPV is just economic profit disguised in present terms. The common idea of economic profit 
maximization is then equivalent to the idea of net present value maximization: “The firm attempts to 
maximize the present value of its net cash flow over an infinite horizon” (Abel, 1990, p. 755) and “the 
net present value rule is also the basis for the neoclassical theory of investment” (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994, p. 5). Decision making is straightforward with such equivalent notions. Rubinstein (1973) shows 
that if the CAPM assumptions are met, a project is worth undertaking if its expected rate of return is 
greater than the disequilibrium required rate of return. His maximization rule is as follows: 
 
The firm should accept the project with the highest excess expected internal rate of return 
weighted by its cost (p. 174)  
 
This result ...  is equivalent to accepting the project with the highest net present value (ibidem, 
footnote 14).  
 
The first quotation just focusses on maximization of economic profit, the second one suggests to 
maximize net present value. Magni (2008) shows that the use of disequilibrium values is standard in 
corporate finance and is widespread in academic papers as well as in textbooks. This paper shows that, 
contrary to what Rubinstein seems to imply, the alleged equivalence of (disequilibrium) NPV and 
economic profit does not hold. Such a NPV does not represent economic profit and, in addition, it is a 
biased measure because it is nonadditive; the same holds for the notion of disequilibrium value.2 In 
                                                 
1See Magni, 2000a, 2000b, 2003, 2005, 2007c for a nonclassical way of formalizing economic profit. 
2Problems in the equilibrium NPV may be found as well (see Magni, 2007a, 2008). 
particular, decision makers abiding by the standard NPV+CAPM methodology give inconsistent 
answers to the same problem differently framed. In other terms, they are trapped in a sort of mental 
accounting (Thaler, 1985, 1999) so that their evaluations differ depending on whether outcomes are 
seen as aggregate or disaggregate quantities. This amounts to saying that their valuations and choice 
behaviours do not comply with the principle of description invariance, which prescribes that valuations 
and decisions must be invariant under changes in description of the same asset. Violations of this 
principle are known as framing effects (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; 
Soman, 2004). This bias bears significant relations to the violation of the principle of arbitrage, which 
is a well-established principle of economic rationality implying that rational decision makers do not 
incur arbitrage losses (see Nau and McCardle, 1991; Nau, 1999). In the field of corporate valuation this 
violation reduces to an infringement of the classical Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 it is shown that NPV and economic profit bear a 
strong formal relation in that the former is the present value of the latter. Section 3 shows an example 
highlighting the fact that NPV does not represent economic profit, is not additive and does not fulfill 
the principle of description invariance (i.e. implies framing effects). In contrast, economic profit is 
additive and frame-independent. Section 4 shows the same results in more formal terms. In section 5 it 
is shown, on the basis of the previous results, that value itself is nonadditive. Section 6 shows that 
NPV-minded decision makers incur arbitrage losses. Section 7 shows that the association of CAPM 
and NPV does not comply with Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. In particular, the choice 
behaviour of a potential NPV-minded buyer is not invariant under changes in the firm debt-equity ratio. 
 
2  Economic profit and NPV as companions 
 
Let 0W  be an investment cost and denote with 1W  the final payoff at time 1. Consider the 
profit 01 WW − , which we can reformulate as 0rW , with 0
01
=
W
WWr −  being the rate of return. 
Consider also an alternative business for the investor and let i  be the relative rate of return. The 
corresponding profit is 000 =)(1 iWWiW −+  and represents an opportunity cost, a foregone return. 
The economic (i.e. excess) profit is given by the difference between the factual profit the entrepreneur 
receives and the counterfactual profit she would receive if she invested in the alternative business. 
Denoting economic profit with π  we have:  
 
 .= 00 iWrW −π  (1) 
 
 Note that the above equation may also be stated as a difference between two future values:  
 
 ).(1= 01 iWW +−π  (2) 
 
From a financial perspective, π  is the Net Future Value. In finance, it is common to work with present 
values so the notion of Net Present Value (NPV) is introduced, which is given by the discounted 
algebraic sum of all cash flows involved in the business. In our simplified one-period case, we have  
 
 .
1
=
1
0
i
WWNPV ++−  (3) 
 
Economic profit and NPV bear a strong formal relation: NPV is the present value of (1) (or, 
equivalently, the present value of (2)):  
 ).(
1
1=
1
= 00 iWrW
ii
NPV −++
π  (4) 
 
For one-period proejcts, economic profit and net future value are different names for the same notion, 
whereas net present value is the present value of economic profit. It is worthwhile noting that eqs. (3)-
(4) preserve the sign of eqs. (1)-(2) (as long as 1> −i , as will be assumed here). Decision-making 
implications of this formal equivalence are straightforward: A business is worth undertaking if and only 
if the economic profit (the NPV) is positive. 
Under uncertainty, the rates r  and i  are expected values and the two rates refer to alternatives 
equivalent in risk, so that eqs. (1) and (3) are measures of expected excess profit (in final and present 
terms respectively). What ‘equivalent in risk’ means depends on the model selected. The classical and 
sophisticated CAPM is the most common tool for measuring an asset’s risk, which is given by its beta: 
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 where mr~  and 
2
mσ  denotes the market rate of return and its variance (a tilde on a symbol will 
henceforth highlight randomness). 
To calculate excess profit (and NPV) under uncertainty one just has to use the fundamental 
equation of the CAPM, known as the Security Market Line (SML). Under suitable assumptions, the 
latter individuates the required rate of return of the business under examination; such a rate is the 
(opportunity) cost of capital, i.e. the expected rate of return of the counterfactual alternative available to 
the entrepreneur. We have  
 )(= fmf rrri −+ β  (6) 
 
 where fr  is the risk-free rate and mr  is the expected market rate of return. Applying this security 
valuation relation to capital budgeting we have a simple rule: A project should be undertaken if and 
only if  
 )(> fmf rrrr −+ β  (7) 
 
 i.e. if and only if its expected rate of return exceeds the cost of capital (see Rubinstein, 1973, p. 171) 
or, in terms of NPV, if and only if its risk-adjusted NPV is positive:  
 
 0>
)(1
1
0
fmf rrr
WW −+++− β  (8) 
 
 where 1W  is the expected value of 1~W . 
 
Remark 1 It is worth noting that the beta in (5) is a disequilibrium beta, so that the NPV in (8) is a 
disequilibrium NPV. Beside Rubinstein (1973), the legitimacy of the disequilibrium beta for computing 
the cost of capital has been deducted from the CAPM by several authors (see Senbet and Thompson, 
1978; Magni, 2007b, for a review).  
 
 
3  Nonadditivity and framing effects: An example 
 
Consider the security market described in Table 1, where a risky asset and a risk-free asset are 
traded and two possible states may occur, conventionally labeled ‘good’ and ‘bad’, with probability 0.8 
and 0.2 respectively. The market is complete, is assumed to be in equilibrium (all marketed assets lie 
on the SML) and arbitrage is not possible.3 Let us imagine an economic agent runs across the 
opportunity of investing in a business A  composed of two sub-projects. The first one, say ,1A  consists 
of an outlay of 15500 euros and generates an outcome of 1
1
~
AW , equal to 58000 in good state and 3000 in 
bad state. The second one, say 2A , consists of an outflow of 70000 euros and a final risk-free inflow of 
72000 at time 1. Suppose also that this two-project business is to be fully accepted or fully rejected (no 
sub-project may be undertaken alone). To decide, the investor computes the NPV of the business. The 
rates of return of 1A  are 058000/1550 −1=2.7419 and 3000/15500 −1=−0.8064 in good and bad state 
respectively; the expected rate of return is 2.0322=2)0.8064)(0.(.8)(2.7419)(0=
1
−+Ar . The 
covariance of 
1
~
Ar  with mr~  is 0.5677=)~,~cov( 1 mA rr  and the risk is therefore 1Aβ =0.5677/0.16=3.5484. 
The cost of capital is 
1A
i = 1.2145=0.15)53.5484(0.40.15=)(
1
−+−+ fmAf rrr β . The economic profit 
is then  
 
 12675=1.2145)2215500(2.03=)(
11
0
1
−− AAA irW  (9) 
 
 while the NPV is  
 5723.=
1.21451
12675=
1
12675=
1
1 ++ AA i
NPV  (10) 
 
 As for 2A , its rate of return is 0.02857= 72/70 −1 in both states. As the project is riskless, the cost of 
capital is 0.15=fr , so the excess profit is  
 
 8500=0.15)8570000(0.02=)(
2
0
2
−−− fAA rrW  (11) 
 
 and the NPV is  
 7391.=
0.151
8500=
1
8500=
2
−+
−
+
−
f
A r
NPV  (12) 
 
 
 
                                                 
3As Dybvig and Ingersoll (1982) show, if (i) the CAPM pricing relation holds for all securities in the market, (ii) the market 
is complete, (iii) the probability that 
fm
m
mm rr
rr −+
2
>~
σ
 is positive, then arbitrage opportunities arise. But in our market 
of Table 1 condition (iii) is not satisfied. 
 
 
Table 1. The security market 
 
   
Security 
 
      
 risky risk-free  Market   
   
Outstanding shares  10    10   
     state probability
 165  115  1650  1s    0.8Cash Flow 
 65  115  650  2s    0.2
  
 65  15  65  1s    0.8Rate of return (%)  
 −35  15  −35  2s    0.2
  Expected  
rate of return (%)  45 15  45   
   
Covariance with the 
market rate of return  0.16  0  0.16 
   
Beta   1  0  1    
   
Value   100  100  1000    
       
 
 
 
Consider now a business B  that can be undertaken with an expenditure of 85500 euros whereby the 
investor will obtain 
1
~
BW , equal to 130000 or 75000 in good and bad state respectively. The rate of 
return of B  is 00130000/855 −1=0.5204 and 075000/8550 −1=−0.1228 in good and bad state 
respectively so that the expected rate of return is Br = 0.1228)(0.2)(4(0.8)0.520 −+ =0.39181. It is easy 
to see that the risk of B  is Bβ =0.6432 and the cost of capital is therefore 
0.15)50.6432(0.40.15= −+Bi =0.34298. The excess profit is  
 
 4175=0.34298)18185500(0.39=)(0 −− BBB irW  (13) 
 
and the NPV is  
 
 3108.=
0.342981
4175=
1
4175= ++ BB i
NPV  (14) 
 
 It is worthwhile noting that the NPV of business B  differs from the NPV of business A , which is 
73915723− = 1668− . Yet, the two businesses represent the same course of action described in two 
different ways, because both share the same total investment outlay (15500+75000=85500) and the 
same final outcomes in good and bad state (58000+72000=130000 and 3000+72000=75000). We have 
then 21 AA + = B . This is a significant result. From a financial perspectives, it means that the NPV is 
nonadditive (because NPV
1A
+NPV
2A
≠ NPV
21 AA + ); from a cognitive and behavioural outlook, it 
means that an NPV-minded economic agent incurs framing effects in decision making, because the 
alternative 21 AA +  is rejected (its NPV is negative) and the logically equivalent alternative B  is 
accepted (its NPV is positive). By contrast, note that the economic profit as translated in (1) gives 
univocal results: Economic profit from B  is 4175, which coincides with economic profit from the two-
project business A  (= 850012675− ). 
 
 
4  Nonadditivity and framing effects: A simple formalization 
 In general, consider an investment whose initial outlay is 0W  and whose final payoff is the 
random sum 1~W , available at time 1. This investment may always be viewed as a portfolio of two 
investments, one risky and one risk-free, whose outlays are hW −0  and h  respectively and whose 
outcomes are kW −1~  and k  respectively, with R∈kh, . The economic profit of the investment may be 
formalized as the sum of these two investments’ excess profits. In order to avoid framing effects, 
description invariance must be guaranteed, which means that economic profit must be invariant under 
changes in h  and k . Indeed, considering π  and i  as functions of h  and k , we have  
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Substituting the latter in (15) we obtain 
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 It is then evident that 0=),(=),(
k
kh
h
kh
∂
∂
∂
∂ ππ  for all h  and k , which means that economic profit does 
not change whatever the way the investment is partitioned (i.e., regardless of aggregation or 
disaggregation of cash flows). 
As for the NPV, seen as a function of h  and k , things are different:  
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 whence  
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1
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 It is evident that, in general, 0),( ≠∂
∂
h
khNPV  as well as 0),( ≠∂
∂
k
khNPV . Therefore NPV changes as 
h  and/or k  change, and it is not true that NPV ),( 11 kh =NPV ),( 22 kh  for all 1h , 2h , 1k , 2k , as the 
principle of description invariance requires. As a particular case, the example above described has 
shown that  
 4175=(0,0)=00)(70000,720 ππ  
whereas  
 3108;=(0,0)1668=00)(70000,720 NPVNPV ≠−  
 
in the latter case choice behaviour depends on the choice of the pair ),( kh , in the former case it is 
irrelevant. 
 
 
5  Value is nonadditive 
  
As a consequence, the notion of value in this context is severely undermined. The value V  of 
an asset is given by V =NPV+ 0W  (where 0W  is the cost to be paid by investors for undertaking it). 
Referring to the numerical example above where B = 21 AA +  and bearing in mind the previous results 
about NPV, we have  
 
 0
22
0
1121
= AAAAAA WNPVWNPVVV ++++  
 0
21
= BAA WNPVNPV ++  
 .==
21
0
AABBB VVWNPV ++≠  
 
with obvious meaning of 0
1A
W , 0
2A
W , 0BW . Putting it differently, value is a function of h  and k :   
 
 0),(=),( WkhNPVkhV +  (18) 
 
whose partial derivatives are not identically zero (see eq. (17)), and thus value is not invariant under 
changes in the description of valuation process. 
  
6 Arbitrage Losses 
 
 The nonadditivity of value and net present value is full of implications. In addition to the 
framing effect above mentioned we have that our NPV-minded investor is subject to arbitrage losses. 
To see why, let us refer to the example in section 3. Suppose an economic agent (whom we can call the 
arbitrageur) asks the investor for a borrowing of 89000 euros whereby he will repay the amount 1~BW  
after one period (the investor accepts to lend money, given that the NPV is easily found to be 112.326). 
At the same time, the arbitrageur offers our investor two financings: A loan of 15500 whereby the 
investor will repay 1
1
~
AW  and a loan of 70000 whereby the investor will reimbursed 72000 euros at the 
end of the period. These financings are to be accepted or rejected conjunctly. Our investor evidently 
accepts, given that − (NPV
1A
+NPV
2A
) is positive (=1668). As a result of this choice behaviour, our 
NPV-minded investor receives a sure loss of 3500 euros. (Table 2 shows the NPV-minded investor’s 
payoffs. Those for the arbitrageur are the same with opposite sign). 
 
 
 
 
   Table 2. Arbitrage loss for a NPV-minded agent 
 
     
 Payoffs 
 
    Time 0  Time 1 
    
Borrowing (= 1A− )   15500  11
~
AW−  
Borrowing (= 2A− )   70000  72000−  
Lending   −89000  1~BW  
   
Net Payoffs   3500− 072000~~ 11
1
=−− AB WW  
 
 
 
7  Violation of Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I 
 
Let us now focus on a world à la Modigliani and Miller (1958) where Proposition I holds, so 
that firm value is not affected by the mix equity-debt. Consider an example of two firms. Firm U is 
unlevered and all the stocks are owned by entrepreneur U; firm L is levered and all the stocks and 
bonds are owned by agent L.4 Let P be a potential buyer and suppose that:   
                                                 
4Agents U and L are therefore representative agents (for sake of simplicity) but one may equivalently consider agents 
holding only some shares and bonds in a convenient ratio.  
 
• the two firms will generate the same total cash flow 1~W  
• agent U is ready to sell his stocks in exchange of 0W  euros 
• agent L is ready to sell his entire endowment in firm L selling the stocks in exchange of  0W  
euros but giving free his bonds to the buyer of the firm 
• the debt of firm L is risk-free 
• agent P is a CAPM enthusiast and selects alternatives via NPV rule. 
 
As a result of the above assumptions, investor P computes the value of both firms as follows. The value 
of firm U is5  
 
U
U k
WV
1
=  (19) 
 where )(= mfUfU rrrk −+ β  is the (unlevered) cost of capital. Denoting with Ur~  the rate of return for 
firm U’s stockholders, the unlevered beta is given by  
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As firm U  is sold at 0W  and will generate payoff 
1~W , the rate of return for the buyer is 1
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The value of firm L is easily found. Denoting with I  the cash flow to debt, the equity cash flow is 
IW −1~ . Bearing in mind that the cost of debt equals the risk-free rate we have  
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I
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where )(= mfefe rrrk −+ β . Denoting with er~  the rate of return for firm L’s stockholders, the beta of 
equity is given by  
 .
)~,~(cov
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m
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e
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σβ  (23) 
 
As equity is sold at 0W , the rate of return is 1
~
=~ 0
1
−−
W
IWre , so that (23) becomes  
                                                 
5The relations presented in this section may be interpreted in two ways: Perpetuity of constant cash flows may be assumed, 
as usual, or (for coherence with the above sections) one may think of a one-period firm so that 1
~W  is the final free cash 
flow, the rates fr , mr , Uk , ek  are capitalization factors (i.e. 1 plus rate), and I  represents interest+principal repayment.  
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 But cov )~,~( 1 mrIW − =cov )~,~( 1 mrW for I  is a real number. Consequently we have  
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 which implies  
 UmfUfmfefe krrrrrrk =)(=)(= −+−+ ββ  (26) 
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This result contradicts Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. This just means what we already know: 
Valuation is not invariant under changes in framing. In this case, we have two financially equivalent 
firms paying off the same total cash flows: viewing the latter either as an aggregate quantity or as the 
sum of two quantities of different nature makes valuation nonequivalent.6 Analogously, choice 
behaviour may differ. Whenever agent P finds that  
 
 UULL NPVWVWVNPV =<0<=
00 −−  
 
then firm U is purchased and firm L is not. In the opposite case  
 
 LLUU NPVWVWVNPV =<0<=
00 −−  
 
it is firm L to be purchased.7 Again, this is a bias in the behaviour of our NPV enthusiast. 
In contrast, economic profit leads to a correct decision: Economic profit from U is  
 
 ,)( 001 WkWW U−−  
 
economic profit from L is  
 [ ] [ ]00)()( 001 ⋅−−+⋅−−− fe rIWkWIW  
 
which are equal since Ue kk = , as shown in (26). 
 
 
                                                 
6We have assumed that agent L gives free his holdings of bonds. This is not restrictive, as the numerical example in section 
3 shows: Assume 1A ’s cash flow is the equity cash flow of a levered firm, 2A ’s cash flow is the cash flow to debt, 1A  and 
2A ’s outlays are just the price at which agent L is ready to sell equity and bonds respectively; suppose also B ’s cash flow 
is the capital cash flow of an unlevered firm and B ’s outlay is the price at which agent U is ready to sell the firm. Then, the 
values of the two firms differ, as seen. 
7Obviously, in this case agent P becomes, at the same time, stockholder and bondholder. 
8  Conclusions 
 
For one-period investments under certainty, the Net Present Value (NPV) of an investment 
represents economic profit. Under uncertainty, a widespread method to value an asset (and thus to 
compute a NPV) is to discount cash flows with a disequilibrium cost of capital calculated via CAPM 
(for the use of an equilibrium NPV see Magni, 2007a, 2008). The (disequilibrium) NPV of an 
investment is formally given by the present value of excess profit (value is then computed as the 
present value of excess profit plus cost). The disequilibrium NPV is validly deducted from the CAPM, 
as Rubinstein (1973) shows. However this paper, focussing on such a disequilibrium NPV shows that:   
 
• while it is true that this NPV is calculated by discounting economic profit (and value is 
found by adding cost), it does not represent economic profit 
• the disequilibrium NPV is nonadditive, which also implies that the disequilibrium value 
is nonadditive 
• NPV-minded decision makers incur framing effects in both valuation (different values 
and NPVs) and choice behaviour (accepting and rejecting the same investment) 
• NPV-minded agents are open to arbitrage losses 
• the standard disequilibrium NPV+CAPM valuation procedure is not consistent with 
Modigliani and Miller’s Proposition I. 
 
Consequently, the association of disequilibrium NPV and CAPM is a flawed methodology and should 
not be used for project valuation and selection, given that it does not fulfill the principle of description 
invariance (valuation and judgment must not depend on framing) and the principle of arbitrage (rational 
decision makers do not incur arbitrage losses). 
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